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COMMENTS
THE DUTY PROBLEM AND CAUSE PROBLEM IN NEGLI-
GENT CASES
(Indian Refining Co. v. Summerland, 172 N. E. 129.)
In the November issue of the Indiana Law Journal, a case
comment approved the disposition made by the Appellate Court
of the case of Indian Refining Co. v. Summerland.1 Since the
publication of that comment, the Appellate Court has granted a
rehearing in the case and reversed its former position. Since
the present writer is responsible in part for the approval of
the former opinion,2 it might be justifiable for him to appraise
the opinion on rehearing, in which the opposite result was
reached by the court. Fortunately, the writer feels that he is
well within the limits of logic and sound tort law to also approve
of the second opinion. To rationalize a position apparently so
odd, a consideration of the fundamental problem involved in the
case is necessary.
The facts of the case are simple. Plaintiff, a child of five, was
sent to defendant's filling station with a glass jar to obtain
gasoline. Defendant filled the jar with gasoline and the child
started to return. While climbing some cement steps, the plain-
tiff fell, broke the jar and cut its wrist. It was claimed that
the gasoline burned the wound, causing sloughing of the flesh.
The plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the defendant.
The trial court passed the case to the jury which found for the
plaintiff in the sum of $2,000. In the first opinion, the Appel-
late court reversed on the ground that there was no evidence
of defendant's negligence. In the second opinion, the verdict
was upheld and judgment below affirmed.
Plaintiff, to substantiate his allegation of negligence, offered
the testimony of one physician who declared that gasoline would
cause a cauterizing of an open wound and result in sloughing
of flesh. Defendant offered the testimony of five physicians
who declared that gasoline did not have such effect, but, on the
contrary is often employed with good results for antiseptic pur-
poses on open wounds. This, together with the statement of
1 Indiana. Law Journal, November, 1930, p. 126.
2 The comment was written by a student editor and "approved" for pub-
lication in the Journal by the writer, as instructor in torts.
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facts set out above constitute all the material evidence of the
case.
In the first opinion the court apparently took the position that
the question of negligence was the only one involved, and, there
being no evidence of negligence, the verdict could not be upheld.
In the second opinion, the ground thereof is not so clear. The
court attacks the negligence issue by saying "whether the act of
placing a glass jar of the size alleged in the complaint filled with
any kind of liquid, which the servant and agent knew was to be
carried by the child up a flight of stone steps was an act of
negligence, was one of fact for the jury to determine." This is
an intelligible way of putting the problem, and while the evi-
dence of negligence is slight (i. e., it is a very close case), a
finding of a breach of duty might well be within the limits of a
reasonable judgment.
The court apparently injects another issue, however, by ob-
serving that "it is certain that the condition in which the child's
wrist was left was the direct result of the breaking of the jar.
The jury believed that the placing of the jar filled with the
liquid in the arms of so young a child was negligence and but
for that negligence, the accident would not have occurred. It is
certain that the cut was the proximate and efficient cause of the
injury." Is there a casual problem in this case? If so,
the court seems to have met the problem with directness.
It conceives that the only problem is is one of cause
in fact, i. e. a problem to be answered by the "but for" test.
If the fall would probably not have happened but for defend-
ant's acts of filling the jar with any kind of liquid, those acts
substantially contribute to the injury, and casual relation is
clear. This is perfectly sound.3
In every negligence case there are four problems, one of
which may be difficult but usually not more than one. These
problems may be described and have been analyzed as follows:
By designating a result as "sound" or "unsound," the writer is neces-
sarily giving his own opinion. But he does not offer his opinion as an ar-
bitrary appraisal of the point in question. What he means is to submit
that, from the point of view of the cases that have received the respect of
the profession, i. e. "authority;" from the point of view of legal logic, i. e.
the kind of logic lawyers and judges use when they indulge in what they
call "legal reasoning;" and from the point of view of common sense, the
proposition in question is satisfactory. This is what is intended by designat-
ing a result as "sound."
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(1) the problem of duty; (2) the problem of violation thereof;
(3) the problem of causation; and (4) the problem of damage.4
Let us consider the aspects of these various problems insofar as
they concern the present case.
The duty problem is often (as in this case) the difficult one.
Does the law protect the plaintiff's interest that has been in-
vaded? What rule or principle of law protects this interest?
Does it protect the interest invaded against the particular risk
to which that interest has been subjected?5 All these questions
must be answered in the affirmative by the court, as a question
of law, before there is any further problem raised. Unless there
is a duty imposed by law, there can be no violation thereof, i. e.,
no negligence (where the case is tried on the theory of negli-
gence). In the present case the interest of the plaintiff that has
been invaded is his interest in his bodily or personal security.
It is such an interest that the policy of the law protects against
both intended and unintended invasion. The rule or principle
of law upon which plaintiff relies for protection of this interest
is that principle which imposes upon one the duty of operating
his business with proper regard for the safety of others when
an ordinary reasonable man would forsee that there was a prob-
ability of harm involved. Now the final question, in determin-
ing whether there is a duty involved which may have been vio-
lated, is the hard one, viz., does the rule relied upon comprehend
the peril which the plaintiff experienced? What was that haz-
ard? The risk of falling with the glass jar and suffering a cut
to which the gasoline became an added source of injury. If this
question can be answered in the affirmative, there is a duty im-
posed toward the particular plaintiff with respect to the par-
ticular risk, and unless the question is answered in the affirma-
tive, the case is ended. There being no duty imposed by law to
cover the facts of the situation, there is no issue of violation for
the jury. On the other hand, if the court can say that there
is a duty imposed by law to cover such a situation, there is a
case for the jury. In other words, this all means merely that
the court is willing to hold the defendant liable if the jury is
willing to do so.6 In such a situation, there is "evidence" of negli-
gence and it is a jury case. If, by chance, the court should feel
positive and have no doubt whatever that the particular plain-
4 See Leon Green, Judge and Jury, Oh. 2 (1930).
5 See Leon Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, see. 1 (1927).
6 Cf. Green, The Palsgraph Case, Judge and Jury, Ch. 8.
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tiff's particular interest was protected by a rule of law against
the particular risk suffered, it could direct a verdict for plaintiff.
But not being willing to go so far, there is merely "evidence of
negligence" and the jury can determine who must bear the loss.
The determination of this question by the jury is the "violation
of duty" problem. In other words, if the court is certain one
way or the other, the case may be disposed of as a problem of
"duty." If it is doubtful, then the jury is entitled to its judg-
ment on the matter under some approved instruction.
Applied to the facts of the case under discussion, what re-
sults are in accord with common sense? Is the rule of law that
requires defendant to operate his filling station with a due re-
gard to the safety of others to be regarded as covering a case of
a child of five bringing a glass jar to procure gasoline? Common
sense demands several factors to be considered. Would a rea-
sonable man forsee that if the child fell and cut itself, the gaso-
line would increase its injury? This goes to the effects of
gasoline upon an open wound and how general such information
is held. The testimony of six doctors differed, one stating that
it would increase the injury; five stating that it would not. At
best, this testimony is conflicting. In case the jury believed the
one rather than the five, what is established? Merely the scien-
tific fact that gasoline does have such an effect. Should the de-
fendant be charged with that knowledge? Under the forsee-
ability test, which is most important, he is to be so charged only
if he actually knew or should have known of it. There was no
evidence whatever that defendant actually knew of such effect
of gasoline upon an open wound and no evidence that such
knowledge was common or general or that an ordinary reason-
able man should have known thereof. Consequently, under the
forseeability formula or test, we are forced to the conclusion
that so far as the additional risk due to the gasoline burning
an open cut, the risk is not within the rule which plaintiff must
rely upon.
There is another aspect to this problem, however. It may be
argued with force that the mere fact that the defendant filled
the glass with a liquid so greatly multiplied the chances that the
child would fall and cut itself that such an event might have
been forseen by defendant and thus should have been avoided.
This properly ignores the fact that the liquid was gasoline. A
like result would be demanded had the defendant filled the glass
with milk, vinegar, or some other liquid. A glass jar full of
COMMENTS
any liquid is heavier and harder to carry than an empty one,
and consequently might be said to increase the chances of a fall.
There are several analogues situations where one increasing
the hazard is regarded as negligent, although most of the cases
are analyzed improperly, as "proximate cause" cases. To men-
tion two examples, where a carrier by negligent delay increases
the opportunity for destruction of goods by storm or flood, it is
liable.7 The risk comes within the rule forbidding unjustifiable
delay. Where, under Workmens' Compensation Acts, risks of in-
jury is increased by the work, defendant is liable.8 The risk
comes within the rule requiring compensation.
But even if the particular risk to which plaintiff has been
exposed does not come within the contemplation of the rule re-
lied upon as disclosed by the test of forseeability, which is not a
final test, it may be included as within the protection of the rule
for other reasons if the reasons are compelling, that is if the
court is strongly of opinion that defendant ought to bear the
loss anyway. These reasons are too numerous and complex to
even attempt to consider.0 They do exist and in many cases
will bring a risk within the protection of a rule of law even
though the risk were unforseeable if the jury find that some
risks were forseeable.' 0 Would common sense uphold the recov-
ery of plaintiff in the present case on exceptional grounds, for it
must be an exceptional case for an unforseeable risk to be within
a rule of law.
Here, it seems to this writer, there is room for a difference
of reasonable opinion. It may well be that defendant's capacity
to bear and distribute the loss is so great, as compared with
plaintiff's that the result is justifiable. It may be that the pro-
tection which the law should throw around children of tender
years should go to such length for the general welfare of society.
Many other considerations make the case a very close one. Con-
sequently, in view of the many considerations of policy, of de-
sirability and of practical convenience, it is impossible to say
that the passing of judgment either way is "true" or "false."
7Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchinson etc. R. R., 94 Minn. 269, 102 N. W.
709 (1905).
s Deckard v. Indiana University, 172 N. E. 547 (Ind., 1930) Commented
on in 6 Ind. L. J. 194 (December, 1930).
0 See Green, The Duty Problem, 28 Col. L. Rev., 1014 (1928), 29 Col.
L. Rev. 255 (1929).
10 Re Polemis & Furness Etc. Co., (1921) 3 K. B. 560.
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Either way, the court is articulating its judgment upon the
"oughtness" of the situation and throwing the loss where it
believes it should be placed. Both opinions are honest and in-
telligent attempts to grasp a difficult problem and answer it as
soundly as the judges could. Both are entitled to the profes-
sion's sincere respect and honest commendation.
Just a word should be said as to the other problems involved,
viz., the casual problem and the damage problem. The latter is
not in issue. The jury found, and properly, so far as is dis-
closed by the record, the damages to which plaintiff was en-
titled if he was entitled to any. The casual relation problem is
no more difficult. If so, if could be passed to the jury in an easy
and appropriate manner. If defendant's act in filling the jar
with gasoline was a material or substantial factor in the fall,
cutting or subsequent sloughing of flesh, it is a cause of such
injury. This is all that is necessary. All questions of the
"proximateness" of the cause, once cause in fact is established,
are taken care of in the foregoing analysis of the duty problem.
The jury might well find that, even though the child might (or
would) have fallen if defendant had put no gasoline in the jar,
yet, the filling of the jar contributed substantially to the fall and
subsequent injury, and was therefore the actual cause of the
damage.1' The two opinions- in this case represent a rational
and able treatment of one of the most difficult problems of the
law, and both are clearly sound.
FOWLER VINCENT HARPER.
11 The question is not what would or might have caused the injury if
defendant's acts had not, but what in fact did cause it.
EXPLANATION OF TWO RECENT CASE COMMENTS
(Rainy v. Lafayette Loan Co., 172 N. E. 128, and Indiana
Refining Co. v. Summerland, 172 N. E. 129.)
In the November issue of the Indiana Law Journal, there ap-
peared two recent Case Comments upon the above decisions of the
Appellate Court. The writer of the comment on the Rainy case
criticised the result and reasoning of the court while the writer
of the comment on the Summerland case approved the decision.
Both cases were reversed on rehearing. (Rainy v. Lafayette
Loan Co., rehearing September 24; Indiana Refining Co. v. Sum-
merland, 173 N. E. 269.) The Summerland case is discussed at
length elsewhere in this issue of the Journal. The Rainy case,
as it was finally disposed of, accords with the criticism on the
original opinion. It is to be observed, however, that the Rainy
case, as to which Judge Remy delivered both opinions of the
court, was finally disposed of some six or seven weeks before the
comment appeared in the Indiana Law Journal. A word of ex-
planation of this situation is in order.
The Indiana Law Journal desires to give to the profession
critical comments and commentaries upon Indiana cases as soon
as possible after they are released to the public. In this way,
there is available a cumulative and up-to-date literature on cur-
rent Indiana law that is presumably of value to Indiana lawyers.
This, however, involves some difficulties. One difficulty is that a
rehearing may be granted or a writ of transfer issued and the
case reversed. The assignment of cases to student editors takes
place very soon after an opinion is handed down. This, together
with the fact that copy for the Journal is sent to the printer
from four to'eight weeks or more before date of publication, ac-
counts for the circumstance that after a case has been selected
for comment but before it has appeared in the Journal, the case
may have been disposed of in a different manner upon a rehear-
ing. This was precisely what happened in the two cases men-
tioned. In the case of Rainy v. Lafayette Loan Co., it is a source
of regret that Judge Remy's first opinion was subjected to ad-
verse comment when he had withdrawn the same and submitted
a most excellent and able analysis of the case before the com-
ment on the first opinion had been published.
FoWLER V. HARPER.
